000			02145cam a22003254a 4500
001			14794270
003			BD-DhUL
005			20160531145615.0
008			070403s2008 maua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2007014164
020			_a9780674024601 (alk. paper)
020			_a0674024605 (alk. paper)
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC _dBD-DhUL
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aKF425 _b.E44 2008
082	0	0	_a348.732 _222 _bELS
100	1		_aElhauge, Einer.
245	1	0	_aStatutory default rules : _bhow to interpret unclear legislation / _cEiner Elhauge.
260			_aCambridge, MA : _bHarvard University Press, _c2008.
300			_avi, 386 p. : _bill. ; _c24 cm.
365			_a$ _b49.50
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aWhy courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.
650		0	_aStatutes _zUnited States.
650		0	_aLaw _zUnited States _xInterpretation and construction.
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0714/2007014164.html
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK
955			_asg09 2007-04-03 _isg09 2007-04-03 _aaa04 2007-04-03 _aps14 2008-02-21 1 copy rec'd., to CIP ver. _asg14 2008-06-30 copy 2 added
999			_c73787 _d73787