000			04026cam a2200505 a 4500
001			1394163
003			BD-DhUL
005			20160425164621.0
008			920408s1993 enka b 001 0 eng
010			_a 92014265
015			_aGB93-56057
020			_a0521350433
020			_a0521330408 (hardback)
035			_a(OCoLC)25746797
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _dDLC _dLC _dBD-DhUL
050	0	0	_aJF1001 _b.B74 1993
050	1	4	_aJF1001 _b.B74 1993
082	0	0	_a324.9 _220 _bBRD
084			_a89.57 _2bcl
100	1		_aBrennan, Geoffrey, _d1944-
245	1	0	_aDemocracy and decision : _bthe pure theory of electoral preference / _cGeoffrey Brennan, Loren Lomasky.
260			_aNew York, NY, USA : _bCambridge University Press, _c1993.
300			_ax, 237 p. : _bill. ; _c25 cm.
365			_aGBP _b32.50
500			_aIncludes index.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 226-231) and index.
505	0	0	_aMachine derived contents note: 1. Ethics, politics and public choice -- 2. The logic of electoral choice -- 3. The nature of expressive returns -- 4. The analytics of decisiveness -- 5. The theory of electoral outcome: implications for public choice theory -- 6. From anecdote to analysis -- 7. Interpreting the numbers -- 8. Consensus, efficiency and contractarian justification -- 9. Paternalism, self-paternalism and the state -- 10. Towards a democratic morality -- 11. Constitutional implications -- Bibliography.
520			_aDo voters in large-scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes they want? Is voting essentially like choosing a job or selecting an asset portfolio? Or is it more like cheering at a football match? And if the latter, what are the implications for the functioning of democracy when policies are determined by who cheers the loudest? This book is concerned with answering these questions. In the most narrow construction, the book offers a critique of the interest-based theory of voting behavior characteristic of modern "public choice" theory - and does so using the decision-theoretic apparatus of standard economics. The central claim is that fully rational voters will not reliably vote for the political outcomes they prefer. The broader objective of the book is to present an "expressive" theory of electoral politics as an alternative to the "interest-based" account. The authors argue that this expressive theory is both more coherent and more consistent with what is observed than is the interest-based orthodoxy. In particular, they believe that this theory can explain, for example, the propensity of democratic regimes to make war; the predominance of moral questions (the sexual conduct of candidates or the abortion issue) on the political agenda; and the distributive activities of democratic governments - facts that represent something of a challenge to the interest-based account. The significance of this account should be clear. If, as economists frequently assert, proper diagnosis of the disease is a crucial prerequisite to treatment, then the design of appropriate democratic institutions depends critically on a coherent analysis of the way the electoral process works and the perversities to which it is prone. The claim is that the interest-based account incorrectly diagnoses the disease. Accordingly, this book ends with an account of the institutional protections that go with expressive voting.
650		0	_aVoting.
650		0	_aSocial choice.
650		0	_aPressure groups.
650		0	_aDemocracy.
653			_aVoter behaviour
653			_aSocial choice
653			_aNonparty political bodies
653			_aDemocracy
653			_aDecision making
653			_aMathematical models
653			_aOverseas item
700	1		_aLomasky, Loren E.
856	4	1	_3Table of contents _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam026/92014265.html
856	4	2	_3Publisher description _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam025/92014265.html
942			_2ddc _cBK
984			_aANL _cYY 324.9 B838
999			_c58237 _d58237