000 02234nam a22003258a 4500
001 CR9781139225694
003 UkCbUP
005 20180107143410.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 111216s2012||||enk s ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9781139225694 (ebook)
020 _z9781107027244 (hardback)
020 _z9781107658196 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_cUkCbUP
_erda
050 0 0 _aJZ5588
_b.B46 2012
082 0 0 _a355/.031
_223
100 1 _aBenson, Brett V.,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aConstructing International Security :
_bAlliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard / [electronic resource]
_cBrett V. Benson.
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2012.
300 _a1 online resource (216 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Oct 2015).
520 _aConstructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments. Understanding these commitments is key, because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of international security order. Benson argues that sometimes the optimal commitment conditions military assistance on specific hostile actions the adversary might take. At other times, he finds, it is best to be ambiguous by leaving an ally and adversary uncertain about whether the third party will intervene. Such uncertainty transfers risk to the ally, thereby reducing the ally's motivation to behave too aggressively. The choice of security commitment depends on how well defenders can observe hostilities leading to war and on their evaluations of dispute settlements, their ally's security and the relative strength of the defender.
650 0 _aSecurity, International
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781107027244
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139225694
_zCambridge Books Online
999 _c236358
_d236358