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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Statutory default rules</title>
    <subTitle>how to interpret unclear legislation</subTitle>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Elhauge, Einer.</namePart>
    <role>
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  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
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  <originInfo>
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    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Cambridge, MA</placeTerm>
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    <publisher>Harvard University Press</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2008</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
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  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
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  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">print</form>
    <extent>vi, 386 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <tableOfContents>Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.</tableOfContents>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Einer Elhauge.</note>
  <note>Includes bibliographical references and index.</note>
  <subject>
    <geographicCode authority="marcgac">n-us---</geographicCode>
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  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Statutes</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Law</topic>
    <geographic>United States</geographic>
    <topic>Interpretation and construction</topic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="lcc">KF425 .E44 2008</classification>
  <classification authority="ddc" edition="22">348.732 ELS</classification>
  <identifier type="isbn">9780674024601 (alk. paper)</identifier>
  <identifier type="isbn">0674024605 (alk. paper)</identifier>
  <identifier type="lccn">2007014164</identifier>
  <identifier type="uri">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0714/2007014164.html</identifier>
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    <url displayLabel="Table of contents only">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0714/2007014164.html</url>
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    <recordChangeDate encoding="iso8601">20160531145615.0</recordChangeDate>
    <recordIdentifier source="BD-DhUL">14794270</recordIdentifier>
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