01270nam a2200277 a 4500001001400000003000800014005001700022006001900039007001500058008004100073020003800114040002100152050001000173082001200183100001600195245011000211260004700321300003600368520032700404588004700731504005100778650002200829776003300851856009100884999001700975EDZ0000075171StDuBDS20150804193948.0m||||||||d||||||||cr||||||||||||091203s2008    enk    fo     001 0 eng d  a9780199866922 (ebook) :cNo price  aStDuBDScStDuBDS 4aBD45004a1262221 aFeit, Neil.10aBelief about the selfh[electronic resource] :ba defense of the property theory of content /cNeil Feit.  aOxford :bOxford University Press,cc2008.  a1 online resource (xvi, 195 p.)8 aPhilosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.  aDescription based on print version record.  aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 0aSelf (Philosophy)08iPrint versionz9780195341362403Oxford scholarship onlineuhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001  c38552d38552