Belief about the self
a defense of the property theory of content
Feit, Neil.
creator
text
enk
Oxford
Oxford University Press
c2008
2008
monographic
eng
1 online resource (xvi, 195 p.)
Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.
specialized
Neil Feit.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Self (Philosophy)
BD450
126
9780199866922 (ebook) :
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001
StDuBDS
091203
20150804193948.0
EDZ0000075171