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  xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><dc:Title>Epistemic value [electronic resource] / edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard.</dc:Title>
<dc:Creator>Haddock, Adrian.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Creator>Millar, Alan, Ph. D.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Creator>Pritchard, Duncan.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Subject>Knowledge, Theory of.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>BD161 .E59 2009</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>121 22</dc:Subject>
<dc:Description>Includes bibliographical references and index.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>Description based on print version record.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture?</dc:Description>
<dc:Publisher>Oxford : Oxford University Press,</dc:Publisher>
<dc:Date>2009.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2009.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2009</dc:Date>
<dc:Type>Text</dc:Type>
<dc:Format>1 online resource (368 p.)</dc:Format>
<dc:Identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001</dc:Identifier>
<dc:Language>eng</dc:Language>

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