Access points
an institutional theory of policy bias and policy complexity
Ehrlich, Sean D.
creator
text
nyu
New York
Oxford
Oxford University Press
c2011
2011
monographic
eng
1 online resource (ix, 198 p.) : ill.
'Access Points' develops a theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. It argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups the cheaper lobbying will be and, thus, the more lobbying will occur.
specialized
Sean D. Ehrlich.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Pressure groups
Lobbying
Trade regulation
Fiscal policy
Banks and banking
Government policy
Environmental policy
JF529
324.401
9780199918645 (ebook) :
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737536.001.0001
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737536.001.0001
StDuBDS
120110
20150804193945.0
EDZ0000054852