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  <controlfield tag="008">121220s2013    enk    fo|    001 0 eng|d</controlfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Swinburne, Richard.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Mind, brain, and free will</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">[electronic resource] /</subfield>
    <subfield code="c">Richard Swinburne.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references and index.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Free will and determinism.</subfield>
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