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  xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><dc:Title>Epistemic authority [electronic resource] : a theory of trust, authority, and autonomy in belief / Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.</dc:Title>
<dc:Creator>Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1946-</dc:Creator>
<dc:Subject>Authority.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Knowledge, Theory of.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Self.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Trust.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>BD209 .Z34 2013</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>121.6 23</dc:Subject>
<dc:Description>Includes bibliographical references and index.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on Nov. 13, 2012).</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply to authority in the moral and religious domains.</dc:Description>
<dc:Publisher>Oxford : Oxford University Press,</dc:Publisher>
<dc:Date>2013.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2013.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2013</dc:Date>
<dc:Type>Text</dc:Type>
<dc:Format>1 online resource.</dc:Format>
<dc:Identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001</dc:Identifier>
<dc:Language>eng</dc:Language>

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