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    <subfield code="a">Cappelen, Herman.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Philosophy without intuitions</subfield>
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    <subfield code="c">Herman Cappelen.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Methodology.</subfield>
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