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  xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><dc:Title>Philosophy without intuitions [electronic resource] / Herman Cappelen.</dc:Title>
<dc:Creator>Cappelen, Herman.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Subject>Methodology.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Intuition.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Evidence.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>BD241</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>101 23</dc:Subject>
<dc:Description>Includes bibliographical references and index.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed on Apr. 19, 2012).</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.</dc:Description>
<dc:Publisher>Oxford : Oxford University Press,</dc:Publisher>
<dc:Date>2012.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2012.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2012</dc:Date>
<dc:Type>Text</dc:Type>
<dc:Format>1 online resource.</dc:Format>
<dc:Identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001</dc:Identifier>
<dc:Language>eng</dc:Language>

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