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  xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><dc:Title>The domain of reasons [electronic resource] / John Skorupski.</dc:Title>
<dc:Creator>Skorupski, John, 1946-</dc:Creator>
<dc:Subject>Reason.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Normativity (Ethics)</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Knowledge, Theory of.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Thought and thinking.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>BD161</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>121 22</dc:Subject>
<dc:Description>Includes bibliographical references and index.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>Description based on print version record.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>This text is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons.</dc:Description>
<dc:Publisher>Oxford : Oxford University Press,</dc:Publisher>
<dc:Date>2010.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2010.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2010</dc:Date>
<dc:Type>Text</dc:Type>
<dc:Format>1 online resource (xxxii, 525 p.)</dc:Format>
<dc:Identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.001.0001</dc:Identifier>
<dc:Language>eng</dc:Language>

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