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  xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><dc:Title>Cognitive phenomenology /  [electronic resource]  [edited by] Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague.</dc:Title>
<dc:Creator>Bayne, Tim.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Creator>Montague, Michelle.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Subject>Phenomenology.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Philosophy of mind.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>Cognitive science.</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>B829.5</dc:Subject>
<dc:Subject>128.2 23</dc:Subject>
<dc:Description>Includes bibliographical references and index.</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed on Jan. 20, 2012).</dc:Description>
<dc:Description>The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology,' that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.</dc:Description>
<dc:Publisher>Oxford : Oxford University Press,</dc:Publisher>
<dc:Date>2011.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2011.</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2011</dc:Date>
<dc:Type>Text</dc:Type>
<dc:Format>1 online resource.</dc:Format>
<dc:Identifier>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001</dc:Identifier>
<dc:Language>eng</dc:Language>
<dc:Relation>Also issued in print format.</dc:Relation>
<dc:Relation>Also issued in print format.</dc:Relation>

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