02250nam a22003378a 4500001001600000003000700016005001700023006001900040007001500059008004100074020002600115020002900141020003000170040002400200050002700224082002100251100003500272245014500307246007200452264005200524300005900576336002600635337002600661338003600687490005200723500007300775520090500848776003501753830005301788856007101841CR9781139628983UkCbUP20180107143410.0m|||||o||d||||||||cr||||||||||||121129s2013||||enk s ||1 0|eng|d a9781139628983 (ebook) z9781107040441 (hardback) z9781107656093 (paperback) aUkCbUPcUkCbUPerda00aJL1859.5.C6 bG56 201300a364.1/3230982231 aGingerich, Daniel W.,eauthor.10aPolitical Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America :bStealing for the Team / [electronic resource]cDaniel W. Gingerich.3 aPolitical Institutions & Party-Directed Corruption in South America 1aCambridge :bCambridge University Press,c2013. a1 online resource (300 pages) :bdigital, PDF file(s). atextbtxt2rdacontent acomputerbc2rdamedia aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier0 aPolitical Economy of Institutions and Decisions aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Oct 2015). aAn important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile.08iPrint version: z9781107040441 0aPolitical Economy of Institutions and Decisions.40uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139628983zCambridge Books Online