02533cam a22002892 b4500 7698269 BD-DhUL 20161121104508.0 m d cr n 940324s1994 ncu es|||||||| 2|eng| 9780198235118 9780198235118 BIP US WaSeSS BD-DhUL 171.5 SCR Scheffler, Samuel Author The Rejection of Consequentialism A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions / 2nd ed.,Reprint,Revised New York : Oxford University Press, 1994 viii, 196 p. : 22 cm. License restrictions may limit access. Annotation In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories,by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Professor Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air ofparadox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view thatthere are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes. College Audience Oxford University Press, Incorporated Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy http://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio7698269 Full text available from Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy ddc BK 126464 126464 0 0 ddc 0 171_500000000000000_SCR 0 NFIC 238311 DUL DUL GEN 2016-11-21 Purchased 171.5 SCR 359502 2016-11-21 1 2016-11-21 BK