03267cam a22003374a 450000100090000000300080000900500170001700800410003401000170007502000440009204000270013605000230016308200170018610000180020324500870022126000400030830000260034836500150037449000350038950000230042450400510044750520750049865000190257365000190259265000170261185600830262890600450271194200120275699900190276895201420278715364749BD-DhUL20161115073101.0080714s2009    mau      b    001 0 eng    a  2008030920  a9780262012737 (hard cover : alk. paper)  aDLCcDLCdDLCdBD-DhUL00aB808.9b.T943 200900a126222bTYC1 aTye, Michael.10aConsciousness revisited :bmaterialism without phenomenal concepts /cMichael Tye.  aCambridge, MA :bMIT Press,cc2009.  axiv, 229 p. ;c24 cm.  aUSDb33.300 aRepresentation and mind series  a"A Bradford book."  aIncludes bibliographical references and index.0 aIntroduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. 0aConsciousness. 0aPhenomenology. 0aMaterialism.413Table of contents onlyuhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0824/2008030920.html  a7bcbccorignewd1eecipf20gy-gencatlg  2ddccBK  c123338d123338  00102ddc406126_000000000000000_TYC708NFIC9231776aDULbDULcGENd2012-10-03ePurchasedo126 TYCp475521r2016-11-15w2016-11-15yBK